ID No.: 1999HZ67002
NAME OF THE STUDENT: Chakravarthi Ramakrishna
DISSERTATION TITLE: On The Timing Of Conscious Experience: A Critical Review Of Libet’s Work
ABSTRACT:
Benjamin Libet performed experiments on the timing of conscious experience over a span of three decades. His intention was to discover the underlying neural processes that mediate conscious experience. The results of his experimental work were considered surprising and a challenge to identity theory and the concept of free will. This thesis attempts to critically evaluate the data and his hypotheses. Drawing from the extensive body of critical literature on Libet’s data and hypotheses (eg., Gomes, 1998, 1999, Churchland, 1981a, 1981b, Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992), it is argued in this thesis that the data has several inherent difficulties and is inadequate for the conclusions drawn by Libet. Further, it is shown that Liber’s hypotheses such as backward referral of sensations’ and ‘conscious control functions that arise without prior neural processes’ are untenable and hence do not have any significant consequences for identity theory and the concept of free will. Several researchers have proposed alternative hypotheses to account for the data (especially that on timing of sensations), those by Gomes (1998) being the most plausible and naturalistic. Importantly, Gomes’ hypotheses provide testable predictions. His proposal rests on the plausibility of postulating a ‘real’ latency. Although he provides a justification for its existence, it is not sufficient to show that real latency lasts for a non-negligible duration. An experimentally based justification for a real latency lasting for a substantial duration is presented in this thesis. Besides, the term “real” latency as described by Gomes seems to be impractical and an alternative term is suggested. With this, the data can be explained within a physicalistic framework. Pending results of further experimentation, one must reject Libet’s hypotheses.
